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Marx’s Genealogy of the Idea of Equality  
David James 
 
Contrary to egalitarian readings of both Marx’s critique of capitalist society and 
its replacement by communist society, his lack of commitment to the idea of 
equality has been emphasized. I argue that Marx’s statements concerning the 
idea of equality, and especially how it would represent an inappropriate norm 
for genuine communist society, are ultimately to be explained in terms of its 
relation to the exchange value that governs acts of commodity exchange. Marx 
wants to show how general recognition of the idea of equality and the legal and 
political forms that it assumes have their origin in the way in which exchange 
value has come to dominate social relations, leading human beings to develop 
an abstract conception of themselves, others and how the world ought to be that 
is incompatible with the goals of communist society.  
 
1. The problem with the idea of equality 
The vision of a classless society suggests a commitment to the idea of equality, for if all class 
distinctions were abolished, would individuals not then have to be regarded as essentially equal 
and be treated as such? And if a society in which people are recognized by one another as 
equals and treat one another as equals is the desired outcome, Marx’s critique of capitalist 
society and his theory of its replacement by communist society appear to presuppose the idea 
of equality, which functions as an ideal, a norm and an ultimate value. As natural as it may 
seem to view Marx as some kind of egalitarian, reasons for denying that he considers equality 
to be valuable, either in its own right or for the way in which it promotes some other human 
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good, have already been provided (Wood 2014). These reasons include how Marx treats 
equality as an essentially political, and distinctively bourgeois, concept, which serves as a 
vehicle of oppression by concealing relations of domination that exist in capitalist society. 
Another reason concerns his rejection of the idea of employing an equal standard to determine 
a just distribution of goods in communist society.  
In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx associates the attempt to apply an equal 
standard only with the first phase of communist society. This is communist society ‘not as it 
has developed on its own foundation, but on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist 
society, hence in every respect – economically, morally, intellectually – as it comes forth from 
the womb, it is stamped with the birthmarks of the old society’ (MEGA I/25: 13; LPW, 213; 
translation modified). During this phase of communist society, each worker is provided with a 
receipt which confirms the amount of labour that he or she has performed. After deductions 
have been made to establish and to maintain a common fund, the worker is entitled to take from 
society’s stores consumption goods equal in value to the value of the remaining amount of 
labour. This exchange presupposes that labour possesses a value that is equivalent to the value 
of these goods. Both the value of labour and the value of the goods received are measured in 
terms of abstract labour time. Thus, for each producer, ‘[t]he same quantity of labour he puts 
into society in one form comes back to him in another’ (MEGA I/25: 14; LPW, 213). An equal 
standard is at work because the same principle of distribution is applied to each producer, and 
each producer is formally entitled to the same benefits in so far as he or she fulfils the same 
obligations. The obligations condition the benefits, because that which each producer receives 
depends on how much he or she has contributed in accordance with the obligation to labour for 
society as a whole. Each and every worker is nevertheless equally subject to the same rule.  
Marx goes on to argue that this application of an equal standard produces outcomes that 
are, in fact, incompatible with the idea of equality, of which this principle of distribution is 
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meant to be the practical expression, since ‘one person is physically or mentally superior to 
another, and hence contributes more work in the same time or can work longer’ (MEGA I/25: 
14; LPW, 214). In other words, according to the mode of distribution that characterizes this 
phase of communist society, the person who is able to perform more labour and thus contribute 
more to society on account of his or her greater strength or superior aptitudes would be entitled 
to more consumption goods than those members of society who are able to contribute less, 
irrespective of whether or not the first person needs more consumption goods than these other 
members of society do. The application of an equal standard would therefore result in 
significant inequalities with respect to the possession of, and thus access to, resources, and so 
the right to be treated equally turns out to be ‘in content … a right to inequality, like all rights’ 
(MEGA I/25: 14; LPW, 214).1 Moreover, an unequal distribution of goods is something that 
Marx himself welcomes, provided it corresponds to differences in the type and the extent of 
the needs that individuals have. Treating everyone equally by applying an equal standard, in 
contrast, requires neglecting the particular differences that distinguish individuals from one 
another, including their different abilities and their different needs. Thus ‘rights would have to 
be unequal, instead of equal’ (MEGA I/25: 15; LPW, 214). Yet this inequality would violate 
the nature of rights, which, unlike privileges, are held to apply both equally and universally. 
To claim that communist society would be preferable to capitalist society in virtue of how it 
would be more equal and, as result, more compatible with a governing principle of distributive 
justice, therefore appears to get things wrong (Sayers 2011: 120-3, 126-30).  
I intend to demonstrate that there is another argument that underlies Marx’s rejection 
of the idea that communist society would be an egalitarian society. This argument relates to his 
claim that the first stage of communist society ‘is stamped with the birthmarks of the old 
society’. I shall argue that Marx’s most fundamental objection to the view that equality 
provides the moral principle which ought to determine the distribution of goods and resources 
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in communist society is that this principle of distribution and the moral idea from which it is 
derived are expressive of a society characterized by commodity exchange and thus governed 
by exchange value. This is what one might have expected, given his claim that in the first phase 
of communist society the principle ‘is the same as the one that applies in the exchange of 
commodities’ (MEGA I/25: 14; LPW, 213).This will enable me to identify the grounds of the 
following key claims found in Marx’s discussion of this phase of communist society: 
 
(1) The claim that with respect to a division of goods undertaken according to 
the principle of equality and the application of an equal standard ‘the operative 
principle is the same as under the exchange of equivalent values: a given amount 
of labour in one form is exchanged for an equal amount in another form’ 
(MEGA I/25: 14; LPW, 213).  
 
(2) The claim that the application of an equal standard to measure the 
contributions and entitlements of each producer requires that individuals be 
‘grasped only in terms of a specific aspect, e.g. considered in a given case only 
as workers, and nothing else about them is taken into account, all else being 
disregarded’ (MEGA I/25: 14; LPW, 214). 
 
These claims will be shown to be bound up with each other, in that the relevant principle and 
the way in which individuals are viewed under only one aspect both require abstracting from 
everything else. This tendency towards abstraction is in turn explained by how abstract 
exchange value has come to govern human relations in a society dominated by commodity 
exchange and thus shape how individuals conceive of themselves and others. In this way, Marx 
provides the basis for the claim that genuine individuality is not possible, or else very difficult 
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to achieve, in modern society, made by some philosophers influenced by him. This 
phenomenon has been attributed to the interests of an all-encompassing impersonal economic 
and social system that requires the suppression of particular characteristics and any other 
properties that serve to distinguish individuals from one another, as in the following passage 
from Theodor W. Adorno’s Minima Moralia: 
 
If the equality of all who have human shape were demanded as an ideal instead 
of being assumed as a fact, it would not greatly help. Abstract utopia is all too 
compatible with the most cunning tendencies of society. That all human beings 
are alike is exactly what suits society. It considers actual or imagined differences 
as stigmas that attest to the fact that not enough has yet been done; that 
something has still been left free of its machinery, is not fully determined by the 
totality (Adorno 2003/2005: no. 66; translation modified). 
 
This passage might be taken to describe any totalitarian form of society that in some way seeks 
to legitimize itself by claiming that equality is the ideal upon which it is based, rather than only 
a liberal capitalist society, which, in fact, considers its ability to accommodate individuality, 
and even to secure the conditions of its free development, as one of its main virtues. Given the 
Marxist heritage of Adorno’s thinking, however, one can assume that he intends capitalist 
society at least as much, if not more so, than other societies which repress individuality in the 
name of equality. The question is then how to explain the link between the levelling process 
that Adorno describes and liberal capitalist society in particular.  
Marx’s answer to this question implies that, if we delve deeply enough below the 
ideological surface, we shall discover that it is not simply a matter of a society failing to live 
up to its own standards by not accommodating individuality and facilitating its free 
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development, but instead also a matter of repressing and preventing them. Rather, the society 
in question cannot live up to this standard because one of its ideals, that of the moral equality 
of all individuals, is bound up with the ultimate source of the levelling tendencies that make 
genuine individuality impossible within this society, namely, exchange value and its 
dominance of a society based on commodity exchange. Marx’s critique of the idea of equality 
does not, therefore, rely on demonstrating that the application of an equal standard produces 
outcomes that are incompatible with the principle of equality itself. Rather, this critique seeks 
to go beyond such surface phenomena. This critique can be classed as a genealogical one in 
that it seeks to locate the origin of the idea of the moral equality of individuals and its legal and 
political expressions in something other than this idea itself, namely, in an economic category, 
exchange value, which essentially belongs to a particular economic and social system. 
Although I shall focus on this origin and how it explains the general recognition of the idea of 
moral equality characteristic of political liberalism, this genealogical mode of inquiry is also 
concerned with the historical process whereby exchange value’s growing dominance of social 
relations is accompanied by increasing general recognition of the idea of moral equality. I shall 
begin by discussing the nature of the question of this idea’s origin. 
 
2. The question of the origin of the idea of equality  
According to Marx, Aristotle recognized that the relation of value between one commodity and 
another commodity presupposes some way of viewing qualitatively different things as 
commensurable. If commodity X is to have the same value as commodity Y, there must be a 
common standard of measurement. This common standard of measurement presupposes some 
way in which commodity X and commodity Y can be viewed as identical, despite their different 
properties. Aristotle did not, however, succeed in explaining how certain quantities of different 
objects or the objects themselves can possess equal value. Marx, in contrast, claims to explain 
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this by means of his labour theory of value. The possibility of treating qualitatively different 
commodities as equal in terms of their value is explained by how these objects possess the 
common property of being products of ‘human labour in the abstract’ (MEGA II/8: 102; Cap. 
1: 166). The value of each commodity can then be measured in terms of ‘socially necessary 
labour-time’, by which is meant ‘the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the 
conditions of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and 
intensity of labour prevalent in that society’ (MEGA II/8: 71; Cap. 1: 129).  
From this we can already see how applying an equal standard – in this case, that of 
equal value measured in terms of the time taken to produce something - involves identifying a 
property that different objects share, while abstracting from those properties that distinguish 
them from one another. The idea of equality, understood in moral, legal or political terms, 
likewise requires identifying a common property that all human beings possess, and which 
explains their equal moral, legal or political status, while abstracting from any personal or 
social properties that serve to distinguish them from one another. By means of this process of 
abstraction through which a common essential property is identified, individuals, who are 
otherwise qualitatively different from one another, come to be viewed as identical. In this way, 
an analogy between commodities and individuals begins to emerge. Commodities are 
reciprocally measurable and exchangeable with one another in virtue of their common property 
of being products of socially necessary labour-time, just as individuals can be accorded the 
same moral, legal or political status in virtue of their possession of a single common property, 
the identification of which requires ignoring all the particular properties that serve to 
distinguish them from one another. I shall now attempt to strengthen this analogy. Although 
the analogy as described so far depends on Marx’s labour theory of value, I do not intend to 
engage with the issue of this theory’s validity, since addressing it is not essential to the 
argument that I shall subsequently develop. What matters is only the assumption that there is 
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some way of viewing commodities as identical, and thus exchangeable, with one another, and 
that explaining this requires abstracting from those properties that distinguish them from one 
another. To explore the analogy further, I shall begin with a passage from the first volume of 
Capital in which Marx explains precisely why Aristotle was necessarily unable to discover the 
concept of value that would provide the solution to the puzzle that he himself had identified, 
namely, how qualitatively different things are reciprocally measurable, and thus exchangeable, 
with one another. The passage in question reads as follows: 
 
Aristotle himself was unable to extract this fact, that, in the form of commodity-
values, all labour is expressed as equal human labour and therefore as labour of 
equal value [gleichgeltend], by inspection from the form of value, because 
Greek society was founded on the labour of slaves, hence had as its natural basis 
the inequality of human beings and of their labour-powers. The secret of the 
expression of value, namely the equality and equal validity [gleiche Gültigkeit] 
of all kinds of labour because and in so far as they are human labour in general, 
can only be deciphered when the concept of human equality has already 
acquired the permanence of a fixed popular opinion. This however becomes 
possible only in a society where the commodity-form is the universal form of 
the product of labour, hence the dominant social relation is the relation between 
human beings as possessors of commodities. (MEGA II/8: 90; Cap. 1: 151-52; 
translation modified). 
 




(1) Given his historical situation and its limitations, it was simply not possible for 
Aristotle to achieve full insight into the essential nature of exchange value. A central 
feature of this historical situation was the institution of slavery, which presupposed and 
expressed a radical inequality of status. The fundamental difference in status between 
the master and the slave was explained and justified in terms of natural differences, 
including by Aristotle himself (Aristotle 1996: 1254a-1255b).  The modern moral, legal 
and political idea of equality, in contrast, presupposes that one can view human beings 
in abstraction from all the purely natural and other contingent features and factors that 
distinguish them from one another, and thereby discover an essential, common property 
in virtue of which all human beings are identical and, on this basis, ought to be accorded 
the same status and thus treated equally.  
 
(2) The modern idea of moral, legal and political equality provides the key to the 
discovery of an adequate theory of the value of commodities, that is to say, a theory 
that is able to explain how commodities are reciprocally measurable and thus 
exchangeable with one another. For Marx himself, this theory is the one according to 
which every commodity embodies a certain amount of abstract, socially necessary 
labour-time.  
 
(3) It follows from (1) and (2) that Aristotle was necessarily not in the position to gain 
insight into the concept of exchange value, because the key to discovering both this 
concept and the theory of value which explains it, namely the concept of legal and 
political equality, was simply unavailable to him, given the historical period in which 
he lived. In modern liberal capitalist society, in contrast, the key to the discovery of the 
concept of exchange value and the theory of value which explains it is available, since 
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in this society the validity of the idea of the moral equality of individuals is generally 
recognized to the point that it has assumed ‘the permanence of a fixed popular opinion’, 
even if a fully consistent, universal application of this idea has yet to be achieved.  
 
(4) The idea of the moral equality of individuals, together with the demand for its legal 
and political realization, achieve general recognition, however, only in a society in 
which the ‘commodity-form’ has begun to dominate human beings in the sense of being 
that which ultimately determines the relations between them as the individual owners 
of commodities that they exchange with one another. Thus, although general 
recognition of the idea of the moral equality of individuals and its legal and political 
expressions are historical conditions of insight into the true concept of exchange value, 
it is the dominance of exchange value within society that explains general recognition 
of this idea and its legal and political expressions. Marx himself makes this clear when 
he states that ‘[e]quality and freedom are thus not only respected in exchange based on 
exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis 
of all equality and freedom’ (MEGA II/1.1: 168; G, 245).  
 
From (4) we can see that there are two stages and directions of inquiry. The first stage and 
direction of inquiry consists in inferring the concept of exchange value from the historical fact 
of general recognition of the idea of moral equality in so far as this recognition has achieved 
legal and political forms. The second stage and direction of inquiry consists in explaining 
general recognition of this idea and its legal and political expressions in terms of the concept 
of exchange value that has been inferred from it, and constitutes the ‘real basis’ of this idea 
and, we might say, its origin. Here, it is clear that an economic relation, the relation between 
commodity owners governed by exchange value, is held to explain an ideological phenomenon, 
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namely, general recognition of the idea of moral equality and the legal and political forms 
associated with this idea. If the dominance of exchange value explains general recognition of 
the idea of the moral equality of individuals, and both this dominance and this general 
recognition, are essentially historical in character as is shown by their absence in the society in 
which Aristotle lived, we must also assume the existence of a historical process through which 
exchange value came increasingly to dominate society and in so doing generated the relevant 
ideological forms. 
I shall now focus on the second stage and direction of inquiry so as to explain the 
relation between moral, legal and political equality and Marx’s account of a society in which 
social relations are governed by exchange value. In order to avoid confronting the issue of the 
validity of Marx’s explanation of exchange value in terms of quantities of abstract, socially 
necessary labour-time, I shall restrict my discussion of this relation to the issue of how the 
dominance of exchange value in society explains how the ideas  of moral, legal and political 
equality have also become dominant within the same society. To this extent, I presuppose only 
that commodities are reciprocally measurable, and thus exchangeable, with one another, while 
leaving open the question of how precisely this is possible. I shall now turn to Marx’s account 
of social relations governed by exchange value and then explain their connection with the idea 
of the moral equality of individuals and the legal and political forms in which this idea finds 
expression. 
 
3. Exchange value and the idea of equality  
According to Marx, a commodity has a ‘double existence’. On the one hand, there is the 
commodity in its ‘natural’ existence, where it is a ‘real’ commodity and something particular 
which is exchanged because of its distinctive properties, that is to say, those properties that 
make it suitable to satisfy a determinate human need and thus give it use value. On the other 
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hand, there is the commodity in its ‘purely economic’ existence as exchange value, where the 
commodity’s exchangeability is made possible by the purely quantitative relation in which it 
stands to other commodities (MEGA II/1.1: 76; G, 141-42). A relation of this type requires 
viewing the object in abstraction from all properties other than that property in virtue of which 
it is identical with all other commodities and can thus be exchanged with them qua exchange 
values. This requirement is reflected in Marx’s description of exchange value as ‘a generality 
[ein Allgemeines], in which all individuality and peculiarity [Eigenheit] are negated and 
extinguished’ (MEGA II/1.1: 90; G, 157). This relation between commodities governed by 
exchange value must find symbolic expression in a third thing that can be exchanged for any 
commodity whatsoever, namely, money.  
The ‘double existence’ of the commodity – that is, its existence as use value, on the one 
hand, and its existence as exchange value, on the other - mirrors the double life led by the 
individual in the modern state that Marx had described years before in On the Jewish Question. 
The state ‘abolishes’ any distinctions based on natural, personal or social factors that serve to 
distinguish individuals from one another, by treating all such distinctions as politically 
irrelevant. Rather, each individual qua citizen enjoys the same political status as others. This 
status is accorded to each individual on the grounds of his or her identity with others, which is 
achieved by viewing individuals in abstraction from all those determinate personal and social 
features that serve to distinguish them from one another. Thus, the individual comes to lead a 
double life, by existing ‘in his immediate reality, in civil society … where he regards himself 
and is regarded by others as a real individual’, on the one hand, and by existing as someone 
who ‘is divested of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality 
[Allgemeinheit]’, on the other (MEGA I/2: 149; EW, 220). In the first case, the individual is 
the human being ‘in his sensuous, individual and immediate existence’, while in the second 
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case this same individual is ‘abstract, artificial man, man as an allegorical, moral person’ 
(MEGA I/2: 162; EW, 234).  
Three analogies here emerge. First, there is the analogy between the individual as a real, 
perceivable being that is ‘particular’ in virtue of being qualitatively distinct from other 
individuals and the commodity in its natural, real form. Secondly, there is the analogy between 
this same individual as an abstract political being, from which all distinctive properties have 
been abstracted to create an artificial entity that is numerically distinct but qualitatively 
indistinguishable from other all individuals and the commodity in its purely economic form. 
Third, this identity of individuals in the modern state finds expression in a third thing, the 
concept of law, since laws, in virtue of their formal character, equally apply to all individuals 
and unite them in a purely external way. This corresponds to how each commodity in its purely 
economic form is governed by the laws of commodity exchange and by exchange value in 
particular, and how it stands in a purely external relation to other commodities. This external 
relation concerns how any actual connection between commodities must first be established by 
an act of exchange facilitated by a third thing, money, in which the relative value of 
commodities finds symbolic expression, but can do so only if all properties other than their 
abstract exchange value are ignored.  
So far it looks as if Marx has suggested some possible analogies while leaving us with 
the following question: how are general recognition of the idea of the moral equality of 
individuals and its legal and political expressions within a society to be explained in terms of 
how exchange value has come to govern social relations within the same society? As it stands, 
Marx has not shown that the correspondences between the legal and political forms in which 
general recognition of the moral equality of individuals finds expression and exchange value’s 
dominance of society are anything more than accidental ones. It could also be the case that the 
idea of moral equality explains the dominance of exchange value, instead of the latter being 
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the origin of the former. Part of Marx’s answer to this question relates to another claim found 
in On the Jewish Question and its connection with the separation of the state from civil society 
that for Marx himself is the result of recent historical developments that culminated in the 
French Revolution. The claim in question is that ‘species-life itself, society, appears as a 
framework extraneous to the individuals, as a limitation of their original independence’ 
(MEGA I/2: 159; EW, 230). 
A society in which exchange value has come to govern social relations will, according 
to Marx, be one in which the exchange value of commodities becomes the immediate object of 
production. The same would be true of any kind of productive capability or other saleable 
attribute over which an agent has initial effective control. The stage at which objects produced 
by means of human labour, productive capabilities or other saleable attributes are viewed 
exclusively in terms of their exchange value draws ever closer with an increasing division of 
labour. This is because each producer’s activity becomes ever more restricted in terms of its 
scope, making individuals correspondingly more dependent on others to produce the means to 
satisfy their needs. These needs have themselves become greater in extent and more complex 
in character in the course of history, a phenomenon which itself presupposes an increasing 
division of labour, whereby ‘the needs of each person have become very many-sided and his 
product has become very one-sided’ (MEGA II/1.1: 128-29; G, 199). Given the dominance of 
exchange value in society, individuals cannot acquire from others the commodities that they 
need without first converting their own products, powers or activities into money, which is the 
universal medium of exchange. Once an individual has done this, he or she can exchange the 
value of his or her commodity for any commodity of the same value, rather than having to 
exchange one particular commodity for another particular commodity. Thus, economic agents 
are constrained to produce objects or to perform activities that can be exchanged for money, 
and so the distinctive properties of the commodities that they exchange become of secondary 
15 
 
importance to them compared to their exchange value. Even if an individual wanted to produce 
or to act with a view to the particular properties of an object or  action, and how this object or 
action corresponds to the determinate needs of other individuals, he or she will be constrained 
by his or her needs and desire to acquire the means to satisfy them to produce something or to 
perform an action primarily with a view to their its exchange value. Given how each 
individual’s ability to meet his or her needs becomes dependent on whether or not he or she 
can turn a commodity of which he or she is the legal owner into the symbolic expression of its 
exchange value, money assumes a ‘seemingly transcendental power’ (MEGA II/1.1: 81; G, 
146). The degree of social power than each individual possesses thus becomes a function of 
how much exchange value, in the form of money, he or she has command over, so that, as Marx 
puts it, ‘[t]he individual carries his social power, as well as his bond with society, in his pocket’ 
(MEGA II/1.1: 90; G, 157). The independent life assumed by the system of exchange enables 
the generation of exchange value to become, in the form of commerce (Handel), an end in 
itself, instead of merely a necessary means of acquiring objects of consumption (MEGA II/1.1: 
83; G, 149).  
The developments described above are characteristic of that which Marx calls 
‘bourgeois society’. This is the same society in which the legal and political equality of 
individuals is generally, if only imperfectly, recognized. Even if this indicates some kind of 
historical connection between increasing general recognition of the idea of the moral equality 
of individuals and exchange value’s increasing dominance of society, and thus something more 
than a mere analogy, it has not yet been shown how the latter explains the former. To show 
this, Marx would have to establish some kind of causal connection between exchange value’s 
dominance of society and general legal and political recognition of the idea of the equality of 
individuals within one and the same society in such a way that the former must be regarded as 
the ground of the latter. This challenge can be illustrated with reference to Marx’s theory of 
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history. Historical materialism claims that in ‘the social production of their lives’ human beings 
‘enter into relations that are specific, necessary and independent of their will, relations of 
production which correspond to a specific stage of development of their material productive 
forces’. The totality of these relations of production form the economic structure of society, to 
which relations between human beings established by acts of commodity exchange would 
presumably belong. A ‘legal and political superstructure’ arises on the basis of this economic 
structure, to which ‘specific forms of social consciousness’ correspond (MEGA II/2: 100; 
LPW, 159-60). The idea of the moral equality of individuals and any legal or political 
expressions of this idea would belong to this superstructure and its forms of social 
consciousness, and so must ultimately be explained in terms of the development of the material 
productive forces of society by way of the social relations of production.2  
This type of historical explanation leaves us with the question of precisely how the 
economic structure of society and the dominant ideas that it generates are related in such a way 
that the ideas and their legal and political embodiments are the effect of an economic structure 
whose relations include ones that are established by acts of commodity exchange governed by 
exchange value. I shall focus on this question so as to avoid the further difficulties introduced 
by any direct appeal to historical materialism and particular interpretations of it. I shall argue 
that Marx provides the basis for an account of a causal connection which is compatible with 
the claim that material, economic factors ultimately explain ideological ones, which is a claim 
that Marx in some form clearly endorses. This connection is, however, a psychological one, 
whose strict necessity I do not pretend to demonstrate. Even if Marx’s account of how material, 
economic factors ultimately explain ideological ones does not require such strict necessity, it 
clearly does require that there is a sufficiently strong tendency for the relevant material, 
economic factors to produce the relevant ideological effects. In this particular case, the 
tendency must be sufficiently strong to explain the demands for legal and political equality 
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characteristic of liberal capital society.3 My account of how exchange value’s dominance of 
society explains these demands concerns a strong tendency on the part of individuals, whose 
relations to one another are governed by exchange value, to think of both themselves and others 
in a correspondingly abstract way. 
In some places Marx emphasizes that commodity exchange involves abstracting not 
only from any properties other than the exchange value of the commodities themselves but also 
form any properties that serve to distinguish the parties to the act of exchange from one another. 
One example of this is provided by the following description of how the worker and the 
capitalist confront each other as owners and exchangers of commodities, which appears to treat 
legal equality as a logical consequence of the equality characteristic of individuals who are 
viewed as nothing more than owners and exchangers of commodities: ‘He and the owner of 
money meet in the market, and enter into relations with each other on a footing of equality as 
owners of commodities [als ebenbürtige Waarenbesitzer], with the sole difference that one is 
a buyer, the other a seller; both are therefore equal in the eyes of the law [beide also juristisch 
gleiche Personen sind]’ (MEGA II/8: 183-84; Cap. 1, 271). Here, both the worker, who owns 
one commodity, labour power, and the capitalist, who owns another commodity, the money to 
pay for the use of this labour power, are different only in that one of them is a seller and the 
other one is a buyer. Apart from this difference, all differences that would otherwise distinguish 
them qua natural persons and individuals with their own characters, needs, ends and interests 
have been abstracted from. Yet even this difference is not a fixed one, for the worker can, or 
rather must, also be a buyer and the capitalist must also be a seller as well as a buyer within the 
system of exchange as a whole. In any case, whether as buyer or as seller, each of them is 
identical with the other in virtue of being someone who engages in an act of commodity 
exchange: ‘each has the same social relation towards the other that the other has towards him. 
As subjects of exchange, their relation is … that of equality. It is impossible to find any trace 
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of distinction … between them; not even a difference’ (MEGA II/1.1: 165; G, 241). Viewing 
human beings in abstraction from any determinate features and relations is likewise necessary 
when it comes to recognizing individuals as legal persons who are equal before the law and 
possess the equal right to dispose of their property as they please. The following passages 
provide examples of how Marx emphasizes that commodity exchange requires abstracting from 
any properties that would distinguish the parties to the act of exchange and how this 
corresponds to the way in which the money form, in which the commodity makes its 
appearance, requires abstracting from the particular properties of any object of exchange: 
 
Each appears towards the other as an owner of money, and, as regards the 
process of exchange, as money itself. Thus indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] and 
equal worthiness [Gleichgeltendheit] are expressly contained in the form of the 
thing. The particular natural difference which was contained in the commodity 
is extinguished, and constantly becomes extinguished by circulation. A worker 
who buys commodities for 3s. appears to the seller in the same function, in the 
same equality – in the form of 3s. – as the king who does the same. All 
distinction between them is extinguished. (MEGA II/1.1: 169-70; G, 246) 
 
A worker who buys a loaf of bread and a millionaire who does the same appear 
in this act only as simple buyers, just as, in respect to them, the grocer appears 
only as seller. All other aspects are here extinguished. The content of these 
purchases, like their extent, here appears as completely irrelevant [gleichgültig] 




The causal connection between exchange value’s dominance of society at the economic level 
and general recognition of the idea of equality at the legal and political levels would then be as 
follows. When exchange value becomes dominant within society, and thus governs social 
relations, not only the particular properties of the commodities exchanged but also the 
particular properties of the individuals who engage in acts of commodity exchange will tend to 
be ignored. Individuals, like the commodities that they exchange with one another, either 
primarily or exclusively with a view to their exchange value, will then confront one another as 
abstract entities, in the sense that none of them has any interest in the other as the particular 
individual that he or she happens to be. Instead, each individual is subsumed by other 
individuals under the general category of buyer or seller, or the even more general category of 
a person with whom one can enter into an act of commodity exchange. Thus the relation of the 
parties to acts of commodity exchange in a society governed by exchange value will be one in 
which ‘they are, as equals [Gleichgeltende], at the same time also indifferent to one another 
[Gleichgültige]; whatever other individual distinction there may be does not concern them; 
they are indifferent to all their other individual peculiarities’ (MEGA II/1.1: 166; G, 242).  
By its very nature, therefore, a society dominated by exchange value will develop in 
individuals the strong tendency to regard other individuals with whom they do not stand in any 
kind of immediate, personal relation (for example, that of family member) or determinate social 
relation (for example, that of a fellow worker engaged in the common struggle against capital) 
as abstract entities, as opposed to human beings who differ in virtue of their particular personal 
and social characteristics. This abstract, merely formal conception of others finds expression 
in their legal and political equality, which is thus made to appear natural by how exchange 
value governs social relations. Yet it is not only a matter of how one conceives of others but 
also a matter of how one conceives of oneself. This is because the relevant relation to others 
tends to determine one’s relation to oneself in that being viewed and treated by others as an 
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abstract entity, as required not only by acts of commodity exchange but also by equal legal and 
political recognition, encourages one to conceive of oneself in the same abstract terms, even if 
this abstract self-conception may be partially offset by more concrete forms of identity.4 
Indeed, this type of self-conception is almost bound to develop as a consequence of the 
additional pressure of having to conceive of one’s own productive capabilities  or other saleable 
attributes in terms of abstract exchange value.  
Then there is the way in which exchange value, and thus one’s own productive 
capabilities or other saleable attributes, assumes the immediate, sensory form of money, the 
units of which measure the value of those aspects of oneself that can be treated as a commodity 
and exchanged with other commodities, thereby providing their value with an abstract material 
expression. This abstract material expression of exchange value circulates in such a way that it 
remains independent of, and thus indifferent to, both the particular commodities exchanged 
and the individuals who exchange them, and so Marx speaks of how equality here posits itself 
objectively (sachlich) (MEGA II/1.1: 169; G, 246).5 It is then becomes difficult to see how an 
individual’s self-conception could remain untouched by the necessity of thinking of his or her 
own productive capabilities and other saleable attributes as detachable features of him- or 
herself in this condition of ‘universal prostitution’, in which social relations governed by 
abstract exchange value are reduced to ‘the universal relation of utility and use’ (MEGA II/1.1: 
95; G, 163). This might involve treating even that which one takes to be unique about oneself 
as a commodity, so that these features of oneself are turned into something separable from 
oneself, and are not, therefore, viewed as intrinsic parts of oneself that serve to distinguish one 
from others. Adorno identifies a phenomenon of this kind in connection with the 
commodification of one’s personality and certain idiosyncratic features of it in the following 




The individualities imported into America, and divested of individuality in the 
process, are called colourful personalities. Their eager, uninhibited 
temperament, their sudden fancies, their ‘originality’, even if it be only a 
peculiar odiousness, even their garbled language, utilize [verwerten] human 
qualities as a clown’s costume. Since they are subject to the universal 
mechanism of competition and have no other means of adaptation to the market 
and coping with it than their petrified otherness, they plunge passionately into 
the privilege of their self and so exaggerate themselves that they completely 
eradicate what they are taken for. (Adorno 2003; 2005: no. 88; translation 
modified)   
 
I shall now summarize the argument. The way in which exchange value dominates society 
generates the natural tendency to think of oneself, others and how the world ought to be in 
terms of formal categories, including those associated with legal and political equality, which 
then reinforce this conception of oneself and others. This is because the detachability of 
productive capabilities and other saleable attributes from one’s own self demanded by a society 
dominated by exchange value invites the reduction of the self to a purely abstract one, which 
can be viewed both by the agent concerned and by other agents as ultimately independent of 
any given or acquired determinate characteristics or features. Instead, any such characteristics 
or features have become detachable, commodifiable parts of one’s own self, which has been 
reduced to a repository of exchange values. Legal and political equality, together with the self-
conception and conception of others associated with them, likewise require an abstract view of 
a self. The abstract view of the self that we encounter in the first case is an effect of how 
exchange value governs social relations in bourgeois society. The abstract view of the self and 
others presupposed by legal and political expressions of the idea of the moral equality of 
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individuals is a reflection of this first abstract conception of one’s own self and that of others, 
which it nevertheless reinforces. Although there may be individual cases in which exchange 
value’s dominance of society does not produce the relevant effects, there is, on the whole, a 
strong tendency for it to produce them and to do so in a sufficiently widespread way. Thus, 
general recognition of the idea of the moral equality of individuals and the legal and political 
expressions of this recognition, which may phenomenally first confront the observer of 
bourgeois society, provide the key to discovering the concept of value that eluded, and had to 
elude, Aristotle, because they need to be explained and the explanation leads back to the form 
of value which explains how objects that are qualitatively distinct can nevertheless be treated 
as identical and exchangeable with one another.  
This would also help to explain how increasing recognition of the idea of the moral 
equality of individuals accompanied by more strident demands for the legal and political 
realization of this idea and exchange value’s increasing dominance of a society based on 
commodity exchange historically emerged at more or less the same time, that is to say, in that 
which Marx himself calls ‘bourgeois society’. The ‘abstract’, ‘artificial’ and ‘unreal’ individual 
is not, therefore, to be identified with the citizen alone. Rather, this individual is also 
encountered at the level of civil society, which is dominated by exchange value and whose 
social relations are governed by it. This implies that widespread and insistent appeals to the 
idea of equality are most likely to be heard when, beneath the surface, abstract exchange value 
dominates society and governs social relations.6 We are therefore now in a better position to 
understand why Marx would want to resist the idea that communist society is egalitarian in the 
sense that each and every member of it will possess the same formal moral status and in virtue 
of this status ought to be treated in accordance with some kind of equal standard. In the final 
section of this essay I shall further discuss Marx’s reasons for wanting to avoid the idea that 




4. The idea of equality and communist society 
Given the elements of Marx’s critique of liberal capitalist society described above, communist 
society will presumably be a society in which individuals relate to themselves and to one 
another as individuals, not as abstract economic, legal or political entities. Thus the statement 
‘from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ (MEGA I/25: 15; LPW, 
215) signals not only a rejection of the claim that an equal standard can, or ought, to be applied. 
There is the deeper problem that the application of an equal standard requires treating 
individuals as abstract entities instead of real individuals, thereby reproducing one of the 
fundamental defects of liberal capitalist society. Although this particular defect may be an 
unavoidable feature of communist society as well in its early stages, conceiving of oneself and 
others as an abstract moral entity cannot be regarded as a goal of this society. A society in 
which each individual contributes according to his or her abilities and each individual receives 
goods and resources according to his or her needs would instead be a society in which people 
are recognized and treated as individuals, and thus can develop the corresponding self-
conception and conception of others in a secure way. Those who contribute according to their 
abilities are recognized as individuals who possess capabilities that not all individuals share, 
while those who do share them may not possess these abilities, or cannot develop them, to 
precisely the same degree. This recognition is manifested not only in certain benefits, such as 
the opportunity to develop these capabilities through the exercise of them and the enjoyment 
of social esteem, but also in society’s expectations regarding the contribution that those 
individuals with the good fortune to possess these capabilities ought to make towards the 
satisfaction of the needs of others. Those individuals who receive goods and resources 
according to their needs – and individuals belonging to the previous group will form a subset 
of this group – will be recognized as individuals with determinate needs that not all others share 
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or do not have to the same degree. In this way, production and distribution in communist 
society, together with the social relations that they generate, would harmonize in that particular 
objects are produced with a view to the satisfaction of particular needs.  
This brings me to a second reason that Marx has for wanting to deny that communist 
society would be an egalitarian one. As we have seen, in capitalist society exchange value’s 
dominance of society and how it determines the production and distribution of goods and 
resources is both historically and psychologically connected with the idea of the moral equality 
of individuals in so far as it finds expression in the concept of the abstract legal person and the 
equal political status enjoyed by citizens. In each case, one views individuals in abstraction 
from the particular properties that serve to distinguish them from one another. Given how 
exchange value’s dominance of society and formal legal and political categories reinforce each 
other, both of them represent a threat to  a society in which each member contributes according 
to his or her abilities and receives according to his or her needs in such a way as to develop the 
appropriate  self-conception and attitude to others, which involves thinking of oneself and 
others as real individuals and being motivated to treat one another as such. Although the 
abolition of exchange value is a necessary condition of the achievement of this goal, it is not, 
therefore, or so Marx suggests, a sufficient one, because formal moral, legal and political 
categories may continue to haunt society after having become independent of the material, 
economic factors that explain their emergence and their appearance of naturalness. This might 
lead people to advocate a model of economic life that has not sufficiently freed itself from the 
model provided by a society based on commodity exchange, whose social relations are 
governed by abstract exchange value. Indeed, this is precisely what appears to happen during 
the first stage of communist society. The idea of the moral equality of individuals can be said 
in this regard to be contaminated by its origin, which is exchange value and its dominance of 
society. Thus, it is not simply the case that the idea of the moral equality of individuals and the 
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legal and political expressions of this idea would no longer be necessary in a fully developed 
communist society. Rather, retaining them would threaten to prevent a clean break with 
capitalist society. This is not to say that Marx is committed to the view that appeals to legal 
and political equality would always be wrong. He himself acknowledges that, under certain 
historical conditions, appeals to these forms of equality are, in fact, expressive of genuine 
emancipatory demands, and that they may, therefore, serve as powerful instruments in political 
struggles, as when he claims in On the Jewish Question that ‘[p]olitical emancipation is 
certainly a major advance. It is admittedly not the final form of human emancipation in general, 
but it is the final form of human emancipation within the world order up to now’ (MEGA I/2: 
150; EW, 221; translation modified). Although Marx allows that the idea of the moral equality 
of individuals is the expression of a valid, deep-seated human impulse, which has, nevertheless, 
historically assumed inadequate or distorted forms, by the time we get to the first stage of 
communist society it is assumed that appeals to this idea will be misguided. For they threaten 
to generate confusion and claims that must be regarded as invalid, and even dangerous, within 
the new society.  
It might be objected that the statement ‘from each according to his abilities, to each 
according to his needs!’ implies the idea of the moral equality of individuals and a 
corresponding commitment to an equal standard whose application ensures that the demands 
of distributive justice are met. For example, if the demand to meet each individual’s needs is 
subsumed under the general value of human flourishing, the statement might be thought to 
imply that such flourishing is something that ought to be equally guaranteed to all. Conversely, 
each member of society would be equally obliged to contribute towards the meeting of 
society’s needs in so far as he or she is able to do so, with contribution being able to take forms 
other than the production of material goods, given the expansiveness of the notion of human 
flourishing (Sypnowich 2018). 7 I do not intend to show that no covert appeal to the idea of the 
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moral equality of individuals and a corresponding commitment to an equal standard are, in fact, 
present, since I think that Marx’s response to this potential objection would be a different one. 
This alternative response would consist in the claim that there is simply no point in 
reformulating the statement in question in egalitarian terms, even if it were possible to do so, 
for there is absolutely nothing to gain from doing so: the demand that each individual 
contributes according to his or her abilities and receives goods and resources from society 
corresponding to his or her needs is perfectly intelligible and capable of doing the work that it 
is meant to do without any appeal to the idea of the moral equality of individuals needing to be 
introduced. Its restatement in egalitarian terms, in contrast, carries with it the danger of 
regression to the ideological framework of bourgeois society, by reawakening the tendency to 
think of oneself and others in abstract terms.  
One might ask against whom Marx’s genealogy of the idea of moral equality and its 
legal and political expressions is directed. It is difficult to see what effect his account of how 
general recognition of this idea and the legal and political demands associated with it have their 
origin in exchange value and the way in which it has come to dominate and govern society 
could have on someone who does not value this idea, unless this person was in favour of a 
society dominated and governed by exchange value but did not at the same time want to accord 
to moral, legal and political equality a corresponding importance and value. Marx’s account of 
the psychological as well as historical connection between exchange value’s dominance of 
society and widespread acceptance of the idea of the moral equality of individuals could 
nevertheless make an egalitarian Marxist feel uncomfortable, because his or her commitment 
to this idea would then be explained in terms of something that he or she presumably wants to 
reject. One way of avoiding this discomfort would be to attempt to detach the idea of the moral 
equality of individuals from its origin, so as to show that the contamination that it may have 
suffered on account of its association with exchange value is not sufficient to demonstrate the 
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untruth and lack of value of this idea. Rather, the link between this idea and exchange value’s 
dominance of society can be regarded as a contingent one. To attempt to detach the two things 
in this way would nevertheless involve a rejection of what I have shown to be a major element 
of Marx’s account of how capitalism and political liberalism are bound up with each other in 
such a way that economic factors ultimately explain legal and political ones, namely, the idea 
that exchange value’s dominance of society generates the tendency to think of oneself and 
others in the abstract terms characteristic of political liberalism. And if the economic structure 
of society is abolished, why should its ideological expression remain, especially when it would 
threaten to perpetuate central features of this economic structure?8  
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1 This idea that the application of the principle of equality within a society committed to this principle is essentially 
self-undermining was already developed by Hegel: 
In a society based on common ownership of goods, in which provision would be made in a 
universal and enduring way, either each receives as much as he needs – in which case there is a 
contradiction between this inequality and the essential nature of that consciousness whose 
principle is the equality of individuals – or, in accordance with that principle, goods will be 
equally distributed, in which case the share bears no relation to the need. (Hegel 1988: 283; 
Hegel 1977: 258; translation modified). 
2 For example, moral notions, including the idea of equality and the subjective rights typically associated with it, 
especially once they have achieved legal recognition by the state, might be explained in terms of their function of 
facilitating the development of the productive forces by serving to maintain and promote the corresponding 
relations of production. See Wood 1981: 130ff. 
3 I do not wish to commit myself to the claim that for Marx any idea whatsoever must ultimately be explained in 
terms of material, economic factors, but only to the claim that ideas  that are key to explaining how a particular 
society distinguishes itself from earlier ones are somehow bound up with a particular economic and social system 
that also distinguishes this society from all previous societies. The fact that the idea of equality is an idea of this 
kind for Marx is clear from his claim that a society based on commodity exchange is ‘the exclusive realm of 
Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say of 
labour-power, are determined only by their own free will. They contract as free persons, who are equal before the 
law … Equality, because they relate to each other only as the owners of commodities and exchange equivalent 
for equivalent’ (MEGA II/8: 191; Cap. 1, 280; translation modified). 
4 Marx has been criticized for neglecting the importance of such sources of identity as religion and nationality, 
and this neglect has been said to reflect a more general failure to consider the importance of the self’s relation to 
itself. See Cohen 1988: 346ff. I think that these criticisms are misplaced because they ignore not only the extent 
to which Marx explains the self’s relation to itself in terms of its relation to others in a situation in which exchange 
value has come to dominate society, but also how exchange value’s dominance of society in this way undermines 
the sources of identity available in earlier societies, which include religion and other senses of belonging to a 
greater whole. This invites the question as to whether modern forms of religion and modern nationalism represent 
attempts to counter the tendency towards abstraction and atomization without understanding the true basis of this 
tendency.  
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5 Much earlier Marx had written about how money possesses the property of being able to buy anything. This 
results in a type of abstraction, because individuals become that which they can buy rather than the actual 
possessors of distinctive properties and characteristics. In this way, the individual becomes the mere placeholder 
of extrinsic properties. Conversely, if an individual lacks money, he or she will, in effect, lack certain capabilities 
and needs that he or she does possess, in so far as the possession of them requires the proper exercise of these 
capabilities and the possibility of satisfying these needs (MEGA I/2: 436-438; EW, 377-79).  
6 This implication poses a potential problem for Marx’s account of history, for it suggests that the historical period 
in which appeals to the idea of legal and political equality were most strident would be the period in which the 
dominance of exchange value was also at its height. In On the Jewish Question, Marx appears to associate appeals 
of this kind with the French Revolution and certain key political documents associated with it, but it is not 
plausible to maintain that at this historical juncture exchange value not only became more dominant in society 
than it had ever been before but also more dominant that it would ever subsequently be.  
7 Another example of where one might be tempted to see the idea of moral equality at work is provided by Marx’s 
notion of ‘species-being’, which implies that all individuals are identical, and thus equal, in virtue of their 
possession of the essential features of the human species that he identifies. These features include the capacity to 
be reflectively aware of oneself as a member of this species as opposed to other ones, which involves the awareness 
of oneself as free in the sense of not subject to the same limitations as these other species, and thus as more 
‘universal’ than they are, and the capacity to act in accordance with this consciousness of the species to which one 
belongs (MEGA I/2: 368; EW 327-28). On the one hand, one could avoid speaking of human beings as being 
equal in virtue of their species-being by saying that this being or essence is common to them or something similar. 
On the other hand, to speak of equality here would be misleading in so far as it suggests that human beings 
manifest their species-being in the same ways or to the same degree, whereas, as individuals, as opposed to mere 
instances of one and the same species, this is not the case. 
8I would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung for the award of a research fellowship during which 
I began work on this article. I would also like to thank Simon Gansinger and an anonymous reader for the 
European Journal of Philosophy for their comments on an earlier version of it.  
